Note to the reader: The criticism directed at the United States in this article focuses specifically on its imperialist foreign policy, not on its people or culture. This policy is understood as a product of capitalism; as demonstrated by Vladimir Lenin, the political theorist and first head of government of the Soviet Union, who noted that “imperialist wars are absolutely inevitable under such an economic system, as long as private property in the means of production exists.”(1)
Political scientist Kenneth Waltz suggests that the root cause of imperialism is great power, observing that “[w]here one finds empires, one notices that they are built by those who have organized themselves and exploited their resources most effectively,” adding that “[w]eakness invites control; strength tempts one to exercise it, even if only for the ‘good’ of other people.”(2)
(1) Lenin, V. I. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Resistance Books, 1999, p. 28.
(2) Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. 1st ed., McGraw-Hill, 1979, pp. 26–27.
In a top-secret report dated February 24, 1948, later declassified, George F. Kennan, Director of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, wrote concerning U.S. policy toward Asia:
“Furthermore, we have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population. This disparity is particularly great as between ourselves and the peoples of Asia. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security.
To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world-benefaction.”
U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning Staff. (1948, February 24). Review of current trends: U.S. foreign policy (PPS/23, Section VII, p. 524). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2 (Document 4). Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d4
On March 18, 1953, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved National Security Council policy statement NSC 144/1, a top-secret document subsequently declassified, outlining U.S. objectives and courses of action toward Latin America:
“1. There is a trend in Latin America toward nationalistic regimes maintained in large part by appeals to the masses of the population. Concurrently, there is an increasing popular demand for immediate improvement in the low living standards of the masses, with the result that most Latin American governments are under intense domestic political pressures to increase production and to diversify their economies. […]
OBJEVTIVES
4. The objectives of the United States with respect to Latin America area:
a. Hemisphere solidarity in support of our world policies, particularly in the UN and other international organizations. […]
d. The reduction and elimination of the menace of internal Communist or other anti-U.S. subversion.
e. Adequate production in Latin America of, and access by the United States to, raw materials essential to U.S. security. […]
g. The ultimate standardization of Latin American military organization, training, doctrine and equipment along U.S. lines.”
National Security Council. (1953, March 18). Statement of policy by the National Security Council: United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Latin America (NSC 144/1). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1952–1954: The American republics, volume IV (Document 3). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d3
In a top-secret draft policy paper forwarded for review under a memorandum dated August 19, 1953, and subsequently declassified, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs examined American economic interests in Guatemala and the effects of President Jacobo Árbenz’s government policies on those interests. The document stated:
“GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
[…]
3. The immediate Communist objective is the elimination of American economic interests, represented in Guatemala by the United Fruit Company, the International Railways of Central America, and the Guatemalan Electric Company. The loss of these enterprises would be damaging to American interests and prestige throughout Central America, and a severe setback to programs for economic development in the hemisphere through private capital investment. [...]
OBJECTIVES
6. The objectives of the United States with respect to Guatemala are: [...]
c. Prevention of the spread of Communist influence from Guatemala to other countries in the hemisphere.
d. Establishment in Guatemala of favorable conditions for the conduct of business by United States interests on mutually advantageous terms. [...]
Annex
Staff Study
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
[…]
4. Guatemala is of special importance to the United States primarily for having provided the leading example of Communist penetration in the American Republics. [...]
5. The principal subsidiary problem facing the United States in Guatemala concerns treatment of private United States interests. Influenced by extreme nationalists and Communists, the Guatemalan Government has begun expropriation of substantial United States-owned assets in the country, having for several years followed a policy of increasing hostility and harassment toward the principal American companies operating there.
These are the United Fruit Company; the International Railways of Central America, (partially owned by the former); the Empresa Electrica de Guatemala, (owned by a subsidiary of the Electric Bond and Share Company); and Pan American Airways. All but the last named have large capital investments in Guatemala.
The crippling or expulsion of these American enterprises would adversely affect the position of United States commercial interests elsewhere in the hemisphere, and would produce a number of subsidiary but troublesome local problems, such as securing just compensation for property seized. [...]
9. […] Communists and fellow travelers instantly seized the opportunity afforded them by the Administration’s proposal to institute agarian reform. They played a leading part in the preparation and enactment of the agrarian law. They have infiltrated the National Agrarian Department established to administer it, and have incited disorderly peasant seizures of privately owned lands. […] The Agrarian Reform Law is being used to attack the United Fruit Company, to destroy the political effectiveness of the large landholders, and to mobilize the hitherto politically inert peasantry in support of the regime. [...]
22. Our present position in Guatemala is progressively deteriorating. Politically, Communist strength grows, while opposition forces are disintegrating; economically, American enterprises suffer continuous whittling away of their properties and contractual rights, while our remonstrances are rejected. Ultimate Communist control of the country and elimination of American economic interests is the logical outcome, and unless the trend is reversed, is merely a question of time. […]
b. Ineffective defense of American enterprises will be followed by similar attacks on these same companies in neighboring countries, and subsequently on other U.S.-owned industries in other Latin American countries. [...]
33. Many of the difficulties encountered by United States commercial interests in Guatemala are the direct work of Communists, but certain problems would remain even after elimination of their influence. Deep-rooted nationalist feeling will remain an obstacle to the solution of some of the principal ones. We should encourage the United Fruit Company, the IRCA, and the Empresa Electrica to negotiate with the Guatemalan Government, whenever that Government is disposed to enter such negotiations in good faith, with a view to revising their concession contracts in such a way as to diminish nationalist prejudices against the companies and at the same time obtain from the Government satisfactory assurances of reasonable treatment of the companies.”
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. (1953, August 19). Draft policy paper prepared in the Bureau of the Inter-American Affairs (Top-secret draft, pp. 1074–1086). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV (Document 424). Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d424
In a secret report dated September 11, 1953, later declassified, the U.S. Psychological Strategy Board described the rise of economic nationalism in Latin America and efforts to reduce dependence on highly industrialized countries:
“Economically, this growing nationalism has resulted in renewed efforts to free their economies from dependence on those of the highly industrialized countries. ‘Economic colonialism,’ in their view, holds them to an unfair trade relationship with the United States and other great industrial countries which, they claim, impose price ceilings on raw materials imported from Latin America while doing little to control the export prices of manufactured goods needed by the Latin Americas.
The strength of this desire for economic independence is seen in such measures as protective tariffs, exchange restrictions, and government-sponsored industrialization. Sentiment is also growing, particularly in Guatemala, Chile and Bolivia, for the expropriation and nationalization of foreign owned enterprises, which in many countries are mainly owned by US citizens, and for more control over the form and scope of foreign investments.”
Psychological Strategy Board. (1953, September 11). Reported decline in US prestige abroad (Secret special report, p. 1495). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2 (Document 223). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v01p2/d223
In a declassified memorandum of a National Security Council meeting on April 6, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded to Treasury Secretary George Humphrey’s concerns about containing communism, using the domino analogy:
“The President, again speaking with great warmth, asked Secretary Humphrey for a reasonable alternative. Indochina was the first in a row of dominoes. If it fell its neighbors would shortly thereafter fall with it, and where did the process end? If he was correct, said the President, it would end with the United States directly behind the 8-ball.”
National Security Council. (1954, April 6). Memorandum of discussion at the 192d meeting of the National Security Council (Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, April 7, 1954, p. 1261). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1 (Document 705). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d705
At a press conference on April 7, 1954, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower explained the strategic importance of Indochina, citing its raw materials and the potential spread of communism through the “falling domino” principle:
“You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things.
First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.
Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world.
Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.
Now, with respect to the first one, two of the items from this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations and so on.
Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can’t afford greater losses.
But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people.”
Eisenhower, D. D. (1954, April 7). The President’s news conference of April 7, 1954 (excerpt). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1 (Editorial Note, Document 716, pp. 1280–1281). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d716
In a declassified State Department memorandum titled Our Guatemalan Policy, dated May 28, 1954, Policy Planning Staff official Louis J. Halle Jr. warned of the potential spread of “Communist contagion” from Guatemala to neighboring countries and the influence its nationalism and social reforms could have across Latin America. The memorandum stated:
“The danger is of Communist contagion and is most immediate with respect to Guatemala’s immediate neighbors. […] It could also spread through the example of independence of the U.S. that Guatemala might offer to nationalists throughout Latin America. It might spread through the example of nationalism and social reform.
Finally and above all, it might spread through the disposition the Latin Americans would have to identify themselves with little Guatemala if the issue should be drawn for them (as it is being drawn for them), not as that of their own security but as a contest between David Guatemala and Uncle Sam Goliath. This latter, I think, is the danger we have most to fear and to guard against.”
Halle, L. J., Jr. (1954, May 28). Our Guatemalan policy (Memorandum to Robert R. Bowie, p. 1147). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV (Document 457). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d457
A study attached to a memorandum dated December 19, 1955, from the Secretary of the U.S. Council on Foreign Economic Policy to the members of the Council stated the following:
“Our foreign policy is aimed at achieving the kind of world community in which trade and investment can move with a minimum of restrictions and a maximum of security and confidence. Thus, almost every aspect of our foreign policy has some ultimate effect, directly or indirectly, upon the flow of private investment abroad.”
National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. (1955, December 12). Investments in less developed areas (NAC Document No. 1868, revised). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1955–1957, foreign economic policy; foreign information program (Vol. IX, Document 137). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v09/d137
In a secret National Security Council report dated August 26, 1958, approved by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and subsequently declassified, the U.S. government outlined its policy toward Africa south of the Sahara:
“The Nature of U.S. Interests
General
[...]
3. […] Europe in turn needs the African market, as well as Africa’s minerals and agricultural products. The United States, therefore, believes it to be generally desirable that close and mutually advantageous economic relationships between the European powers and Africa should continue after the colonial period has passed.
4. We wish to avoid in Africa a situation where thwarted nationalist and self-determinist aspirations are turned to the advantage of extremist elements, particularly Communists. We also wish to avoid the deprivation of African markets and sources of supply to Western Europe, [...]
Specific
5. Economic. American economic interests in Africa are important although not to be compared with other areas. Total American investment in Africa South of the Sahara is now about $500 million, the majority in the Union of South Africa. The area is a predominant source for the United States of such strategic materials as asbestos, cobalt, columbite, corundum, industrial diamonds, tantalum ore, palm kernel oil, and chemical chromite. The United States also imports many other agricultural and mineral products (including uranium) from the area. Our exports to the area, although limited in almost all parts of the area by governmental restrictions which discriminate in favor of the metropolitan powers, are important to the countries concerned. Total U.S. trade with Africa South of the Sahara now equals more than $1 billion annually. [...]
Policy Guidance.
[...]
j. Private Foreign Investment. The United States should encourage the removal of obstacles to private foreign investment, and explore new means of encouraging the flow of U.S. and other Free World investment to the area, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises, making full use of available investment guaranties and tax incentives. [...]
Policy Guidance:
[...]
b. As an antidote to the blandishments of Egypt and the Soviets, encourage the North African states to exert influence in the area, without engaging in irresponsible irredentism, if practicable in the light of our relations with France.”
National Security Council. (1958, August 26). Statement of U.S. policy toward Africa south of the Sahara prior to calendar year 1960 (NSC 5818, pp. 25–26, 35, 37). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV (Document 8). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d8
In a declassified telegram dated June 5, 1965, U.S. Embassy counselor Francis J. Galbraith warned that Indonesia’s political influence under President Sukarno could spread across Africa and Asia, potentially facilitating the expansion of international communism. He wrote:
“Present GOI has become deeply hostile to most of what USG striving for internationally in today’s world. If Indo virus is allowed to spread unchecked in AA world it could be particularly insidious front runner for international communism. ‘International Nasakom’ coalition concept could be of real use to ChiComs and would undoubtedly have more appeal in Islam-impacted Middle East than uncompromising brand of purely Communist-directed violent revolution.”
U.S. Embassy in Indonesia. (1965, June 5). Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State (Telegram 2641, p. 267). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines (Document 124). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d124
In a declassified analytical summary dated October 28, 1970, National Security Council staff member Viron P. Vaky outlined the objectives proposed in a State and Defense Department options paper concerning U.S. policy toward Salvador Allende’s government in Chile. The document stated:
“II. U.S. Objectives
The following objectives are listed by the paper:
The prevention of establishment by the Allende government of an authoritarian Marxist regime, prevention of the regime’s falling under Communist control, and prevention of its influencing the rest of Latin America to follow it either as a model or through its external policies;
To act as a counterpoise to Soviet influence;
To protect U.S. economic interests; and
To protect U.S. security interests.”
Vaky, V. P. (1970, October 28). Analytical summary of an options paper (NSSM 97—Chile, p. 418). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973 (Document 167). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d167
In a declassified memorandum dated November 5, 1970, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger warned President Richard Nixon that the consolidation of Salvador Allende’s government in Chile could threaten U.S. interests. He wrote:
“The consolidation of Allende in power in Chile, therefore, would pose some very serious threats to our interests and position in the hemisphere, and would affect developments and our relations to them elsewhere in the world:
—US investments (totaling some one billion dollars) may be lost, at least in part; Chile may default on debts (about $1.5 billion) owed the US Government and private US banks.
—Chile would probably become a leader of opposition to us in the inter-American system, a source of disruption in the hemisphere, and a focal point of support for subversion in the rest of Latin America.
—It would become part of the Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics; and it might constitute a support base and entry point for expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence and activity in the region.
—The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact on—and even precedent value for—other parts of the world, especially in Italy; the imitative spread of similar phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our own position in it.”
Kissinger, H. A. (1970, November 5). Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon (p. 440). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973 (Document 172). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d172
In a declassified memorandum of conversation dated November 6, 1970, President Richard Nixon and senior U.S. officials discussed their policy toward Chilean President Salvador Allende’s government during a National Security Council meeting at the White House. The document stated:
“Director Helms read from the briefing paper which is attached at Tab A. The President interrupted to review what Director Helms said about the makeup of the Allende Cabinet. He wished to emphasize the degree to which the Cabinet ministries were controlled by Marxists.
The President then asked Dr. Kissinger to brief.
Dr. Kissinger: All of the agencies are agreed that Allende will try to create a socialist State. As for our response to this, the SRG came up with four options. But really basically it amounts to two choices: (1) seek a modus vivendi with the Allende government, or (2) adopt a posture of overt and frank hostility. In between is a third possibility: adopt what is in fact a hostile posture but not from an overt stance, that is, to move in hostility from a low-key posture. [...]
[Secretary Rogers:] Private business and the Latin American countries believe that we have done the right things up to now. If we have to be hostile, we want to do it right and bring him down. A stance of public hostility would give us trouble in Latin America. We can put an economic squeeze on him. He has requested a debt rescheduling soon—we can be tough. We can bring his downfall perhaps without being counterproductive. [...]
Secretary Laird: I agree with Bill Rogers. We have to do everything we can to hurt him and bring him down, but we must retain an outward posture that is correct. We must take hard actions but not publicize them. We must increase our military contacts. We must put pressure on him economically. He is in the weakest position now that he will be in; we want to prevent his consolidation.
Moorer [to Rogers]: What is the reaction of the Congress?
Secretary Rogers: There is very little, but if he consolidates his position the criticism will build up. Attitudes are therefore favorable to our policy.
Moorer: What would be the reaction if he resorts to expropriation later, after we have given more aid?
Secretary Rogers: We shouldn’t give any more credit guarantees. We should do everything we can to show hostility without publicizing it. [...]
The President: It is all a matter of degree. If Chile moves as we expect and is able to get away with it—our public posture is important here—it gives courage to others who are sitting on the fence in Latin America. Let’s not think about what the really democratic countries in Latin America say—the game is in Brazil and Argentina. We could have moves under the surface which bring over time the same thing. [...]
[The President:] Our main concern in Chile is the prospect that he can consolidate himself and the picture projected to the world will be his success. A publicly correct approach is right. Privately we must get the message to Allende and others that we oppose him. I want to see more of them; Brazil has more people than France or England combined. If we let the potential leaders in South America think they can move like Chile and have it both ways, we will be in trouble. [...] No impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this, that it’s safe to go this way.”
National Security Council. (1970, November 6). Memorandum of conversation of a meeting of the National Security Council (Secret; Sensitive). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973 (Document 173). Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d173
In a declassified U.S. State Department paper titled Chile Strategy, dated December 1, 1972, the department outlined its policy toward the socialist government of Chilean President Salvador Allende. The document stated:
“The basic U.S. interests in Chile are to prevent the consolidation of the Allende regime; to minimize the acceptance and emulation elsewhere of the Allende regime; to protect the major principles of our international economic policy [...]. In pursuit of these interests, we seek to maximize pressure on the Allende Government while maintaining a correct but cool posture [...]. We would hope to have maximum international criticism of Chile’s economic policies aired at the Paris meetings.”
U.S. Department of State. (1972, December 1). Chile strategy (Paper prepared in the Department of State, pp. 661, 663). In Foreign relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–16, Documents on Chile, 1969–1973 (Document 127). Office of the Historian. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve16/d127
In 1997, the renowned astronomer, planetary scientist, and science communicator Carl Sagan noted that the United States spent well over $10 trillion on the Cold War, writing:
“Between the beginning of the Cold War in 1946, and its end in 1989, the United States spent (in equivalent 1989 dollars) well over $10 trillion in its global confrontation with the Soviet Union. Of this sum, more than a third was spent by the Reagan Administration, which added more to the national debt than all previous administrations, back to George Washington, combined.”
Sagan, Carl. Billions and Billions: Thoughts on Life and Death at the Brink of the Millennium. Random House, 1997, pp. 196–97.
Richard Saull, a senior lecturer in international politics at Queen Mary University of London specializing in the Cold War, argues that U.S. hostility toward the Soviet Union and other revolutionary states during the Cold War stemmed primarily from their challenge to the global capitalist economic order, rather than ideological differences alone:
“It was not then—as suggested by ideational scholars—mainly a concern with the different ideological values of the Soviet leadership and the way in which this challenged US post-war goals, but rather the fact that the socio-economic organization and reproduction of the Soviet type of society (and its expansion into east-central Europe and beyond) removed a geo-economic space from involvement in capitalism, cutting off potential markets for US and international capital, as well as claiming to be a societal alternative to American-led capitalism. Further, it was not only the case that the USSR threatened the international (and domestic American) social reproduction of a capitalist kind of society, but that other revolutionary states—that emerged throughout the history of the Cold War—extended this threat, as well as those revolutionary and communist social and political movements active throughout the Cold War who were committed to overthrowing capitalist social arrangements.”
Saull, Richard. “American Foreign Policy During the Cold War.” US Foreign Policy, edited by Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 62–63.
In his 1995 book US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower Without a Mission?, international relations scholar Michael Cox argued that the fundamental objectives of U.S. foreign policy remained largely unchanged after the Cold War, stating:
"[M]any of the broader objectives sought by the United States since 1989 actually bear a strong resemblance to those it pursued before the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR. Admittedly the geopolitical context has altered. But the underlying aim of the US —to create an environment in which democratic capitalism can flourish in a world in which the US still remains the dominant actor— has not significantly altered. Analysts seem to have become so attached to the idea that everything has changed since the fall of communism that they sometimes forget there is a great deal which has not. There is much about our new world order which is not really 'new' at all."
Cox, Michael. US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower Without a Mission? Pinter, 1995, p. 5.
In a Pentagon draft of the Defense Planning Guidance dated February 18, 1992, U.S. defense planners outlined their post-Cold War strategy. The document was leaked by a U.S. government official who wanted it debated publicly, and excerpts were published by The New York Times on March 8, 1992. The National Security Archive later restored these passages by overlaying the newspaper’s published text onto redacted sections of the Pentagon’s partially declassified version, rather than relying on their independent declassification.
“It is improbable that a global conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will re-emerge from the Eurasian heartland for many years to come. Even in the highly unlikely event that some future leadership in the former Soviet Union adopted strategic aims of recovering the lost empire or otherwise threatened global interests, the loss of Warsaw Pact allies and the subsequent and continuing dissolution of military capability would make any hope of success require several years or more of strategic and doctrinal re-orientation and force regeneration and redeployment, which in turn could only happen after a lengthy political realignment and re-orientation to authoritarian and aggressive political and economic control. Furthermore, any such political upheaval in or among the states of the former U.S.S.R. would be much more likely to issue in internal or localized hostilities, rather than a concerted strategic effort to marshal capabilities for external expansionism -- the ability to project power beyond their borders.
[...]
There are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor. But because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs -- as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the need to counter a global threat re-emerge...
[...]
The former Soviet state achieved global reach and power by consolidating control over the resources in the territory of the former U.S.S.R. The best means of assuring that no hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources within the former Soviet Union is to support its successor states (especially Russia and Ukraine) in their efforts to become peaceful democracies with market-based economies. A democratic partnership with Russia and the other republics would be the best possible outcome for the United States. At the same time, we must also hedge against the possibility that democracy will fail, with the potential that an authoritarian regime bent on regenerating aggressive military power could emerge in Russia, or that similar regimes in other successor republics could lead to spreading conflict within the former U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe.
For the immediate future, key U.S. concerns will be the ability of Russia and the other republics to demilitarize their societies, convert their military industries to civilian production, eliminate or, in the case of Russia, radically reduce their nuclear weapons inventory, maintain firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries.
[...]
NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance’s integrated command structure.
[...]
... Defense of Korea will likely remain one of the most demanding major regional contingencies. ... Asia is home to the world’s greatest concentration of traditional Communist states, with fundamental values, governance, and policies decidedly at variance with our own and those of our friends and allies.
To buttress the vital political and economic relationships we have along the Pacific rim, we must maintain our status as a military power of the first magnitude in the area. This will enable the U.S. to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon.
[...]
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil. We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to play a strong role through enhanced deterrence and improved cooperative security.
We will seek to prevent the further development of a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent. In this regard, we should work to have both countries, India and Pakistan, adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With regard to Pakistan, a constructive U.S.-Pakistani military relationship will be an important element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in Southwest Asia and Central Asia. We should therefore endeavor to rebuild our military relationship given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concerns.”
U.S. Department of Defense. (1992, February 18). Defense planning guidance, FY 1994–1999 (Draft, pp. 3–4, 16, 18, 21–22; excerpts restored from the 1992 New York Times reporting). National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_extract_nytedit.pdf